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Abstract  
Provided there are positive external benefits attached to the historic character of buildings, 
owners of properties in designated conservation areas benefit from a reduction in uncertainty 
regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the restrictions put in place to ensure the 
preservation of the historic character limit the degree to which properties can be altered and 
thus impose a cost to their owners. We test a simple theory of the designation process in 
which we postulate that the optimal level of designation is chosen so as to Pareto-maximize 
the welfare of local owners. The implication of the model is that a) an increase in preferences 
for historic character should increase the likelihood of a designation, and b) new designations 
at the margin should not be associated with significant house price capitalization effects. Our 
empirical results are in line with these expectations. 
 
 
Keywords: Designation, Difference-in-Difference, RDD-DD, England, Gentrification, 
Heritage, Property Value		
JEL classification:  H23, H31, R40, R58	 
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1 Introduction 
One of the key motivations for a variety of spatial planning policies is how to solve coordination 
problems inherent to free markets. Wherever non-traded positive or negative non-pecuniary 
externalities exist, prices no longer provide efficient signals to market actors. In such a situation 
individually rational decisions may be collectively irrational which implies that it is theoretically 
possible to improve welfare by means of regulatory policies. Among such policies historic 
preservation that aims at the protection of historic buildings with a particular aesthetic, cultural 
or historic value, occupies a leading position in terms of the rigidity of the related regulations as 
well as the complexity of related social and private costs and benefits. The policy is controver-
sial because the preservation of socially desirable buildings comes at the cost of restricting indi-
vidual property rights. On the one hand, the policy would not be equitable if individual owners 
bore the cost of a presumed social welfare improvement. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that by imposing binding standards the policy helps to overcome a coordination problem among 
homeowners. Since owners can no longer “freeride” on the character of nearby buildings while 
making inappropriate changes to their own properties the policy helps to solve a so-called pris-
oner’s dilemma and eventually benefits the owners (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012). 
With this contribution we provide a framework to empirically analyze the practice of preserva-
tion policy and its impact on the utility of local homeowners. We develop a simple model world 
in which we distinguish between a heritage effect, which can be internal or external, i.e., the ef-
fect of the appearance of a historic building on the perceived value of the house itself (internal) 
or nearby houses (external), and a policy effect, which results from the legal treatment of the 
designation policy. We argue that with positive heritage effects, the policy benefits the owners 
by removing uncertainty regarding the future of the neighborhood, i.e., the presence of the her-
itage effect. These benefits are opposed by the costs of regulation (in the form of development 
restrictions and maintenance obligations) so that the net effect of the policy effect is ambiguous. 
Our theoretical framework predicts positive, but diminishing returns to designation. We consid-
er the policy (locally) Pareto-efficient if the designation share is maximized under the condition 
that the benefits of designation do not exceed the costs for any owner in the neighborhood.  
From the theoretical framework we derive two empirical specifications that allow us to test the 
nature and (local) welfare impact of the preservation policy. Firstly, provided that the planner 
behaves as an agent of the owners, new designation will result from increases in the local pref-
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erences for heritage. Secondly, a Pareto-optimal designation policy implies that at the margin, 
the costs and benefits of designation will offset each other, resulting in a zero impact of designa-
tion on the value of designated properties. At all other locations in a neighborhood the effect 
will be positive. We test these implications using two different empirical approaches. Firstly, we 
identify a causal effect of changes in neighborhood composition, what we define as gentrifica-
tion, on the likelihood of designations using a tobit IV approach. Secondly, we use a hybrid dif-
ference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) identification strategy to 
estimate the causal effect of new designations on the market value of properties. Our analysis is 
based on the whole of England, making use of 1 million property transactions from 1995 to 
2010 and of about 8,000 designated conservation areas, of which 915 have been designated in 
the same observation period. We also make use of ward level education data from the UK census 
for 1991, 2001, and 2011 in order to analyze the effect of changing neighborhood characteris-
tics on the designation status. Previewing our results we find that that an increase in the local 
share of residents holding a university or college degree leads to an expansion of the designated 
area. The property price effect inside newly designated conservation areas turns out not to be 
statistically distinguishable from zero. We find evidence that the effect just outside the conser-
vation area boundary is positive and significant. These results are in line with a Pareto-optimal 
designation policy at the local neighborhood level, which can thus be argued to solve a coordi-
nation problem among homeowners (and landlords) within a neighborhood. We emphasize that 
it is not possible to conclude from these results that the policy is globally Pareto-optimal since 
excessive historic preservation on a wide scale may lead to adverse welfare impacts through 
supply restrictions as argued, for example, by Glaeser (2011).  
Our analysis of the conservation area designation process adds to a growing body of literature 
on the political economy of housing markets, which implicitly or explicitly assumes that proper-
ty owners are able to influence political outcomes in their own interest (e.g. Ahlfeldt, 2011; 
Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2013; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner, Sonstelie, & Thayer, 2001; 
Cellini, Ferreira, & Rothstein, 2010; Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2008; Fischel, 2001a, 2001b; 
Hilber & Mayer, 2009; Oates, 1969). We also contribute to a literature which investigates the 
costs and benefits of spatially targeted policies that aim at improving neighborhood quality (e.g. 
Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Cheshire, Hilber, & Kaplanis, 2011; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010; Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte, & Owens, 2010) as well as research that has looked into the value amenities 
add to neighborhoods and cities more generally (e.g. Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, & Wolf, 2012; 
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Brueckner, Thisse, & Zenou, 1999; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Edward L. Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 
2001). Notably, there is also a growing body of literature that is investigating the property price 
effects of designation policies, mostly focused on the U.S. (e.g. Asabere, Hachey, & Grubaugh, 
1989; Asabere & Huffman, 1994; Asabere, Huffman, & Mehdian, 1994; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; 
Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Edward L Glaeser, 2011; Leichenko, Coulson, & Listokin, 2001; 
Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991).  
The key contribution of this study is to provide insights into the political economy of conserva-
tion area designation and to examine whether the outcome is Pareto-efficient for local home-
owners. We also make a number of more specific, though still important contributions. Firstly, 
the theoretical framework we develop lends a structure to the designation process that helps to 
interpret the existing evidence that has typically been derived from ad-hoc empirical models. 
Secondly, our analysis of conservation area effects on property prices is one of the few rigorous 
analysis of this kind available for Europe (e.g. Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Koster, Van Ommeren, 
& Rietveld, 2012; Lazrak, Nijkamp, Rietveld, & Rouwendal, 2013) and the first to analyze Eng-
land. It is unique in terms of the size and spatial detail of the data set and special in its focus on 
the spatial modeling of heritage externalities. Thirdly, our difference-in-differences analysis of 
the designation effects on property prices is the only study along with Koster at al. (2012) that 
uses a quasi-experimental research design to separate the policy effect of designation from cor-
related location effects. It is unique in using particularly carefully selected control groups. 
Fourthly, we make use of a novel combination of RDD and DD approaches to identify the policy 
effects on outcome trends and discontinuities from quasi-experimental variation, which could 
be applied more generally to program evaluations. Fifthly, we provide the first empirical analy-
sis of the determinants of heritage designation. More generally, we establish a novel connection 
between the spatial outcome of a political bargaining process and one of the most striking con-
temporary urban phenomena: gentrification. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces our theoretical model of 
heritage designations and the institutional setting. Section three presents our empirical strate-
gy. A presentation and discussion of our empirical results is in section 4. The last section con-
cludes. 
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2 Theory and context 
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
We assume that a linear neighborhood exists along a spatial dimension   on the interval      . 
Each parcel of land at point   is occupied by a housing structure which is endowed with      
units of internal heritage. The aggregate of the distribution of internal heritage gives the herit-
age character (external heritage)  of the neighborhood at any point in time. Owners care about 
their initial endowment of internal heritage     , which is under their full control, and the long 
run external heritage, which may be damaged by their neighbors’ property (re)developments. 
Such redevelopments occur in the long run with a probability of        where       is the 
‘preservation probability’ in the absence of conservation policies. The effect of conservation 
areas is to increase the preservation probability to   for parcels of land within their bounda-
ries.1 Therefore, long-run external heritage depends on both the internal heritage distribution 
and the level of designation. 
Within the neighborhood, the initial internal heritage monotonically decreases in x. The theoret-
ical argument does not depend on the functional form. For simplicity we assume h(x) to be a 
linear function of the heritage endowment at the neighborhood’s center (  ): 
             (1) 
One way to rationalize this distribution is to assume a neighborhood that grew outwards from 
its historical center (at    ) until the neighborhood limit (at    ) and an internal heritage 
that strictly increases in the age of the housing unit.2  
To protect the neighborhood heritage, a planner can choose to designate a conservation area 
that covers all locations in the neighborhood from the historical center up to a point     and 
hence, a share       of the neighborhood. Since heritage is monotonically decreasing in   it 
is always rational to start designating at    . By affecting the preservation probability, the 
designation share   determines the external heritage amount to be expected in the long run. 
The expected long-run external heritage derived from undesignated locations       corre-
                                                             
1  Our argument does not depend on the assumption of full preservation probability, only that preserva-
tion is more likely inside conservation areas. 
2  Alternatively, x can simply be interpreted as the rank of a property in the heritage distribution. 
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sponds to the integral of the distribution of internal heritage multiplied by the preservation 
probability, ∫         
 
 
. This is added to the amount derived from designated locations    
  , which is simply the integral of the internal heritage as the preservation probability is equal 
to one, ∫        
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        ∫        
 
 
 ∫         
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)  
 
 
       
  
(3) 
The expected external heritage integral        is indicated by the whole grey-shaded area in 
Fig. 1. below. The expected amount of external heritage saved by the preservation policy is illus-
trated as the black-dotted area  ̌ which denotes the difference in (expected) external heritage 
between a scenario with no designation and a scenario with a designation share  . This amount 
is: 
 ̌         (  
 
 
)  (4) 
As evident from the partial derivatives, the amount of external heritage saved by the policy in-
creases with the designation share but at a decreasing rate: 
  ̌
  
 
       
  
                
(5) 
   ̌
   
 
       
  
            
(6) 
The partial derivatives of  ̌ (which are the same as of  ) with respect to   establish a central 
stylized fact of our theory: There are diminishing returns to designation. 
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Fig. 1.  Expected heritage distribution with partial designation 
 
Notes:  The function      gives the internal heritage at each location in the neighborhood. The expected external 
heritage is equal to the grey-shaded area and is the integral of      up to the designation share plus the 
integral of   times this      from the designation share until the neighborhood limit at    . The stippled 
area marked ̌ is the amount of expected external heritage preserved by the policy. 
To link the distribution of heritage in the neighborhood to the utility U of an individual residing 
at x we define a utility function:  
                (7) 
where   is a composite consumption good and   is housing space. The Cobb-Douglas form is 
motivated by the empirical observation that housing expenditure shares tend to be relatively 
constant across geographies and population groups (Davis & Ortalo-Magné, 2011).      is a 
composite amenities term: 
                           ̃    (8) 
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where   is a further composite indicator of   non-heritage amenities,3      is the internal her-
itage endowment (i.e., heritage character of the specific housing unit),   is the internal heritage 
preference parameter,        is the external heritage (i.e., expected heritage of surrounding 
units, which depends on the designation policy) and is conditional on the designation share as 
defined above,   is the external heritage preference parameter, and   represents the costs of 
designation policies, which arise from the development restrictions imposed inside conserva-
tion areas. The cost to an individual is     ̃    and depends on the local designation status  ̃   , 
a binary function of  , which takes the value of one if     and zero otherwise. 
We assume a social planner seeking a Pareto-efficient designation share, which in the model 
implies maximizing the designation share (and the external heritage effects) on the condition 
that by designation the utility is not reduced at any location in the neighborhood.  
The positive marginal utility effect of designation at any location in the neighborhood is given 
by:  
     
  
 
  
       
       
  
                   
(9) 
The negative utility effect to an owner of a property changing designation status from zero to 
one is: 
     
  ̃   
 
  
  ̃   
       (10) 
By setting the social marginal benefit equal to the private marginal cost of an affected owner the 
planner finds the Pareto-efficient designation share D* by solving for D: 
     
 
        
 (11) 
Based on the resulting efficiency condition we can derive some useful comparative statics (see 
also Figure A1 in the Appendix). The (Pareto) optimal designation share is greater when people 
have a greater taste for external heritage   or where there is altogether more heritage (deter-
mined by the heritage endowment at the neighborhood center   , and implicitly the age of the 
neighborhood): 
                                                             
3  Non-heritage amenities are given by:    ∏   
  
  where the different amenity levels are denoted 
   and are given a collective scaling factor   and individual parameters   . 
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   (12) 
   
   
   (13) 
There is less optimal designation when the preservation probability   (if left undesignated) 
increases or if the cost of designation increases:  
   
  
   (14) 
   
  
   (15) 
These theoretical implications are in line with intuition and can in principle be transformed into 
empirically testable hypotheses. However, the heritage at the neighborhood center   , the 
preservation probability   and the costs to owners of conservation policies   are all difficult to 
observe in reality. For that reason we will concentrate on testing the first comparative statics 
implication about taste for heritage (proxied by the education level of the local population) in 
the empirical section.  
To develop a testable hypothesis on whether the efficiency condition is fulfilled, i.e., the planner 
sets     , we incorporate capitalization effects in the next step. We first assume that individ-
uals maximize their utility defined above subject to a budget constraint:         , where 
     is a housing bid rent. Furthermore we assume spatial equilibrium such that all locations 
offer the same level of utility ̅ which we set equal to one: 
                    
 
 
      ̅    (16) 
This can be rearranged to give the spatial equilibrium bid rents for a representative individual: 
          [                         ̃   ]
 
    
(17) 
In keeping with intuition, the bid rent increases in the expected external heritage, which de-
pends on the designation share   and the internal heritage endowment      and decreases in 
the designation cost, which is locally constrained to     as defined above. 
The spatial equilibrium condition can be used to derive the marginal effect of an increase in 
designation share on rents in the neighborhood. At all locations in the city a marginal increase in 
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designation share   triggers a positive effect on rent through an increase in the expected exter-
nal heritage. At the margin, in addition, the change in designation status ̃ also creates a cost.  
     
  
 
{
 
 
 
      
       
       
  
 
     
  ̃   
  ̃          
     
       
       
  
       
 
(18) 
Substituting in the Pareto optimal designation share      derived above we get: 
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)        ]          
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)        ]  
    
   
       
 
(19) 
The two conditions directly translate into two testable hypotheses. If the designation process is 
in reality Pareto optimal, we expect the marginal effect of designation on housing rents to be 
zero at newly designated locations and to be positive at all other locations in the neighborhood. 
Likewise, an excessive or restrictive designation policy will be associated with negative or posi-
tive marginal designation effects. 
Assuming that the preservation probability (if undesignated) and the preservation costs are 
held constant our theory predicts that, in equilibrium, (Pareto optimal) designations occur as a 
result of an increase in the benefits associated with (external) heritage. Such increases in bene-
fits will occur mechanically over time if the internal (and thus the external) heritage depends on 
housing age. The effective benefits will also increase as a result of neighborhood turnover, if the 
in-migrating residents have larger heritage preferences than the incumbents. Designation then 
becomes a collateral effect of ‘gentrification’. The older the conservation area, the greater the 
accrued benefits of designation may be.  
Contrary to the assumption in our theory there is evidence suggesting that heritage externalities 
(Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012) or housing externalities more generally 
(Rossi-Hansberg, et al., 2010) decline quite steeply in distance. The implication is that at the 
center of a conservation area, where the effective external heritage is largest, the marginal des-
ignation benefit will be larger than at the margin. We justify our simplified theory on the 
grounds that most conservation areas are small in reality even compared to the narrow scope of 
housing externalities. Moreover, we allow designation effects to vary in distance to the conser-
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vation area boundary and provide estimates of designation effects at the boundary, the critical 
point for Pareto-efficiency as the policy benefits are presumably at their lowest.  
2.2  Institutional context 
In England, the designation of conservation areas started in 1967 and continues today under the 
provisions 69 and 70 of the Planning Act 1990 (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas).4 Con-
servation areas are those that have been identified as having “special architectural or historic 
interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section 
69). The Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 (PPG15) states that a conservation area “may form 
groups of buildings, open spaces, trees, historic street patterns, village greens or features of 
historic or archaeological interest. It is the character of the areas rather than individual build-
ings that conservation areas seek to enhance.” Conservation areas are designated on the 
grounds of local and regional criteria. After the designation, the Local Authority has more con-
trol over minor developments and the demolition of buildings (Botrill, 2005). However, the pro-
tection an area receives when it is designated a conservation area is determined at the national 
level to reflect the wider interests of society. 
In 2011 there were around 9,800 conservation areas in England. Conservation areas vary in 
character and size. Many have strong historical links, for example an architectural style associ-
ated with a certain period. Besides these characteristics, designation is made based on softer 
benefits said to have emanated from conservation area designation including: the creation of a 
unique sense of place-based identity, encouraging community cohesion, and promoting regen-
eration (HM Government, 2010).5 This ‘instrumentalization’ of conservation policy, which seeks 
to encompass heritage values, economic values, and public policy outcomes, has been identified 
as a key shift in the English policy context (Pendlebury, 2009; Strange, 2003). This is reflective 
of the notion of heritage not as a single definable entity, but as a political, social, cultural, and 
economic “bundle of processes” (Avrami, 2000cited in Pendlebury, 2009: 7). 
                                                             
4  However, the first legislation to protect the historic environment was enacted in 1882 when the An-
cient Monuments Protection Act was passed to protect a small number of designated ancient monu-
ments. More statutory measures came into force in the ensuing years, but it was the passage of the An-
cient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act in 1913 that set out a more comprehensive legis-
lative framework for the protection of ancient monuments. 
5  See for details HM Government (2010): The Government’s Statement on the Historic Environment for 
England. London: DCMS. 
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In combination with bottom-up schemes leading to designation (e.g., community-led designa-
tion), the complex heritage preservation agenda which pursues a multitude of objectives and 
the institutional setting with responsibilities shared across several institutional layers creates 
significant scope for organized interest groups like property owners to influence the outcome of 
a political bargaining process. 
3 Empirical Strategy 
3.1  Designation process 
The first potentially testable implications of our theoretical model are the partial derivatives 
(12) to (15). As mentioned in the theory section it is difficult to find feasible proxies for the var-
iables  ,   and   . We therefore concentrate on testing the first of these conditions, i.e., the 
‘taste’ for heritage   has a positive effect on optimal designation share    in a neighborhood. We 
adopt the common assertion that the demand for urban consumption amenities increases in 
education and income (Brueckner, et al., 1999; Carlino & Saiz, 2008; Edward L. Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; van Duijn & Rouwendal, 2013). In particular, we assume that the 
preference for heritage    in a neighborhood   is related to the share of people in the neighbor-
hood who hold a higher education certificate (    )6 with the following functional form: 
         
       (20) 
where     such that the relationship is positive. Since the purpose of our empirical exercise is 
to evaluate the causal impact of changes in heritage preferences on designation status – and not 
the causal impact of education on heritage preference – it is sufficient to assume that   captures 
a correlation between education and heritage preferences.     is a random disturbance term 
capturing determinants of heritage preferences that are not correlated with education. Rear-
ranging the Pareto-efficient designation share equation (11), substituting the education degree 
proxy relationship and taking logs we arrive at the following empirical specification: 
                                (21) 
where                   and               . (22) 
                                                             
6  We also use income as a proxy for a subsample of our data set – results are reported in the appendix. 
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The   subscripts correspond to the individual ‘neighborhoods’ of our theoretical model and we 
choose to represent these empirically as UK Census wards. Wards are the smallest geographical 
areas that are comparable between 1991 and 2011 Censuses. Subscript t stands for time peri-
ods for which we use the Census years of 1991 and 2011. All idiosyncratic time-invariant loca-
tion components    (location-specific determinants of designation not modeled in our theory) 
and the unobserved heritage endowment     of a neighborhood   as captured by    as well as 
the preservation probability   and the costs to owners of conservation policies are removed by 
taking first-differences: 
                              (23) 
Our estimation equation now depicts that a neighborhood change reflected in a positive change 
in (log) educational degree share causes the (logged) share of undesignated land on the left-
hand side to decrease. This is just another way of saying that a positive change in educational 
degree leads to a higher designation share, although the transformation is non-linear. Note that 
we implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium in the sense that all areas that should be desig-
nated at   are in fact designated. To support the case, we estimate our model using a long differ-
ence between 1991 and 2011, which is more than two decades after the start of the policy and 
the initial wave of designations. Results for the smaller differences between 1991–2001, and 
2001–2011 respectively, are reported in the appendix. 
Equation (23) evidently follows from a stylized model world. In the empirical implementation 
we add a number of covariates to control for alternative determinants of designation. The on-
going designation is then only determined by the local changes in preferences and the steady 
aging of buildings and the effects on heritage, which are differentiated out. To control for the 
contagion effects in designation we add the initial (1991) designation share. A number of varia-
bles are added to account for heterogeneity in the net benefits of designation and abilities to 
express (collective) opinions in a political bargaining that may influence the designation deci-
sion. These include the initial (1991) degree share, the homeownership rate, and the household 
size (both in initial shares and changes). We alter the baseline model in a number of robustness 
checks to account for institutional heterogeneity at the TTWA level, neighborhood appreciation 
trends and, to the extent possible, the historic and physical quality of the housing stock.  
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In practice, however, it is difficult to control for all determinants of designation that are external 
to our model. One particular concern is that areas can be designated if the heritage is threatened 
by poor maintenance in a declining neighborhood. Such derelict is likely to be negatively corre-
lated with our explanatory variable and is unlikely to be fully captured by the control variables 
we have at hand. At the same time, the policy itself could make it more likely that educated peo-
ple are attracted to designated areas due to a different valuation of uncertainty (reverse causali-
ty). Since an OLS estimation of equation (23) can result in a significant bias in either direction 
we make use of instrumental variables   , which predict changes in education, 
                , but must be conditionally uncorrelated with the differenced error term,  
            . We argue that rail station (in London additionally Tube station) density as well 
as effective employment accessibility (both time-invariant in levels) are good predictors of 
neighborhood gentrification (Florida, 2002; Edward L. Glaeser, et al., 2001).7 We also argue that 
it is unlikely that these level variables directly impact on the likelihood of designation condi-
tional on the unobserved heritage endowment in the fixed effects  .  
Another empirical concern is that, theoretically, a decrease in preferences for heritage must 
provoke a reduction of the designated area. The abolishment of conservation areas, however, is 
extremely rare in England (as in most institutional contexts) so our data is left-censored (we do 
not observe increases in the share of undesignated land). We therefore take the model to the 
data using a tobit approach: 
  
                                     
     (24) 
, where   
             is a latent variable and the observed variable is defined as follows 
   {
  
       
                
       
                                    
 (25) 
                                                             
7 Our measure of effective employment accessibility aggregates employment in surrounding regions 
weighted by distance. We use exponential distance weights that are popular in the theoretical (Fujita & 
Ogawa, 1982; Rossi-Hansberg, et al., 2010) and empirical literature (Ahlfeldt, et al., 2012; Ahlfeldt & 
Wendland, 2013) and the decay parameter estimate provided by Ahlfeldt (2013). Transport infrastruc-
ture is captured by a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2 km which is considered 
to be the maximum distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005). 
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3.2  Pareto optimality 
To test whether the designation share in practice is set at the (locally) Pareto-optimal level (D*) 
we estimate the effect of the event of designation on property prices within and surrounding 
conservation areas. In its essence our quasi-experimental methods are a derivative of the estab-
lished difference-in-differences (DD) methodology (e.g. Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). 
We draw elements of the increasingly popular regression discontinuity designs (RDD) (Imbens 
& Lemieux, 2008), however, to relax the DD assumptions of homogeneous trends and a singular 
treatment date to separate smooth variation (e.g., externalities) and discontinuities (e.g., policy 
zones) in treatment effects from correlated unobservables.  
Difference-in-differences 
We define a group of 912 ‘treated’ conservation areas as those that were designated between 
the years 1996 and 2010 to ensure we observe property transactions both before and after the 
designation date. Our counterfactuals are established via various control groups of housing 
units that are similar to the treated units but are themselves not treated. These control groups 
are discussed in more detail in the results section and in the appendix (Section A2.2). 
Our baseline DD model takes the following form: 
     
     
     
                  
                   
             (26) 
where     is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property   in time period  ,    is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation area,    
indicates observations external to the treated CA. While our standard models use a buffer area 
of 500m we also experiment with various alternative spatial specifications.        is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the transaction year t is equal to or greater than the designation 
year,    is a vector of controls for property, neighborhood and environmental characteristics,    
is a set of   location fixed effects and    are year effects. The  
      and        parameters give 
the difference-in-differences estimates of the designation effect on the properties within and 
just outside a conservation area. We show in Appendix 2.2 that        is equal to the net mar-
ginal policy (designation costs and benefits) effect while        reflects the pure (albeit spatially 
discounted) policy benefit. 
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Temporal regression discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD) 
The standard DD specification (26) identifies the policy treatment effect under some arguably 
restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the treatment and control groups follow the same trend before 
and after the treatment. Secondly, the treatment occurs at a singular and a priori known date 
and affects the level (and not the trend) of the outcome variable. These assumptions are evi-
dently violated if the outcome variable does not respond immediately to the treatment, e.g., be-
cause of costly arbitrage, or in anticipation of the treatment, for example because of an invest-
ment motive by buyers (Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013). In our case, a positive pre-trend can also be 
associated with the gentrification that causes designation according to our theoretical model, a 
reverse causality problem.  
To address these limitations of the standard DD we refine the model to accommodate differ-
ences in trends across the treatment and the control group. We borrow the functional form from 
the RDD literature where a (temporal) treatment effect is identified as an instant adjustment – a 
discontinuity – conditional on higher order polynomial (pre- and post-) trends, which are as-
sumed to be unrelated to the treatment (Bento, Kaffine, & Roth, 2010). In our regression discon-
tinuity design of differences (RDD-DD) we combine an RDD-type polynomial specification of 
trends with the control group-based counterfactual from the DD. It is therefore possible to at-
tribute pre- and post-trends to the treatment as long as it is credible to assume that treatment 
and control groups would have followed the same trend in the absence of the treatment. It is 
notable that even if this assumption is violated the RDD-DD (unlike the standard RDD) will at 
least remove macro-economic shocks from the treatment effect by taking differences from the 
control group. This improves identification so long as the control group remains unaffected by 
the treatment. Our RDD-DD with linear trends takes the following form: 
where      is the number of years since the designation date, with the pre-designation years 
having negative values. As in the RDD, the polynomial degree of the trend can be increased sub-
ject to sufficient degrees of freedom. We make use of a quadratic trend specification and evalu-
ate the fit of the parametric polynomial function using a semi-parametric version of (27) that 
     
     
              
     
              
                
                           
                
                            
             
(27) 
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replaces the      variables with full sets of years-since-designation effects (details in the ap-
pendix). 
A significant ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter (       or       ) can be entirely attributed to the treatment 
even under the existence of complex relative trends that are unrelated to the treatment or may 
even have caused the treatment as the comparison is made just before and just after the treat-
ment date. Under the assumption of homogeneous counterfactual trends the significant pre-
trend parameters       or     ) describe the anticipation effects. Significant post-trend param-
eters (         or         ) then indicate changes in relative trends after the treatment. In con-
junction, the ‘dis-in-diff’ and the pre- and post-trend parameters describe the full temporal 
structure of the treatment effect. As a program evaluation tool that is applicable to a variety of 
event studies, the RDD-DD thus naturally comes with a stronger test (dis-in-diff) and a weaker 
test (trends) of whether there exists an effect of the treatment. 
Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD) 
In contrast to our theory, in reality there most likely exists a spatial decay to the heritage exter-
nalities. This decay implies that the external heritage effect should be stronger at the center of 
the conservation area than at the boundaries. The policy benefit, which is a transformation of 
the external heritage effect, should also be greater at the center of the newly designated conser-
vation area. Likewise, the predicted positive policy effects just outside the boundary should be 
decaying in distance to the conservation area (CA) boundary. At the CA boundary there may be 
a discontinuity as the cost of the policy ends abruptly at the boundary, whereas potential exter-
nalities decay smoothly across it. The combination of trends and discontinuities potentially 
caused by the treatment resembles the temporal identification problem just described and will 
be addressed by a similar combination of RDD and DD tools. Essentially, we use the RDD tools to 
capture how the difference (before and after) in the differences (treatment vs. control) of prop-
erty prices varies along the (internal and external) distances from the CA boundary. Unlike in 
the standard (spatial) RDD, unobserved time-invariant spatial effects can be held constant due 
to the availability of spatiotemporal variation. In our spatial RDD-DD model it is therefore pos-
sible to attribute spatial trends (with respect to distance to the CA boundary) as well as a dis-
continuity (at the CA boundary) to the treatment provided that the spatial trends are uncorre-
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lated with unobserved temporal trends. The spatial RDD-DD we estimate takes the following 
form:8 
where   is the distance from the property to the conservation area boundary (internal distanc-
es are negative values),    indicates properties outside a treated conservation area and    indi-
cates the conservation area that is nearest to a property that is treated at any point of the study 
period. In order to fully explore the extent of spatial externalities    indicates a larger area out-
side CAs9 rather than just within 500m as indicated by    in previous models. As with the tem-
poral RDD-DD specification we also estimate an expanded model specification in which we al-
low for quadratic distance trends and semi-nonparametric specifications replacing the distance 
variable with some distance bin effects. 
The coefficient        gives the intercept of the internal effect (i.e., the internal effect at the 
boundary) and         estimates how this changes with respect to internal distance. Jointly, 
these terms capture the net policy costs and benefits of designation for internal treated areas. A 
zero        coefficient would be reflective of a zero effect at the boundary and would be in line 
with the optimality condition derived in the theory section. A negative         would be in line 
with the existence of policy benefits (due to increased preservation probability) that spillover 
with decay. The parameters        and         allow for a spatial discontinuity treatment effect 
at the boundary and heterogeneity in spatial trends inside and outside the treated areas. As 
with        , a jointly negative                 would be in line with the decaying policy bene-
fits external to the conservation area. The discontinuity at the border is measured by the exter-
nal intercept term       . A statistically positive estimate would indicate a cost to the policy. A 
jointly positive effect of               would in turn indicate the existence of policy benefits.  
                                                             
8  In models with historical CAs as control groups the following terms are also included            
        
           , where    indicates internal to control CA and     external to control CA. This 
ensures that spatial effects are estimated conditional on the spatial trends in control CA. 
9  Specifically, the empirical analysis uses properties within 1,400m of the treated conservation area.  
     
     
           
                  
                      
   
             
                  
                       
  
           
(28) 
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4 Data 
We have compiled two distinct data sets for the two stages of the empirical analysis. Both data 
sets make use of data provided by English Heritage. These include a precise GIS map of 8,167 
conservation areas in England, the Conservation Areas Survey containing information on com-
munity support and risk status (average condition, vulnerability and trajectory of a conserva-
tion) and a complete register of listed buildings. 
For the analysis of the determinants of designation we use UK census wards as a unit of analy-
sis. Shares of designated land within each Census ward are computed in a Geographical Infor-
mation Systems (GIS) environment. Various ward level data on educational level, average 
household size and homeownership status and vacancy rate were obtained from the UK Census. 
Any changes in ward boundaries between the years were corrected for using the online conver-
sion tool GeoConvert.10 For robustness tests we also collected a measure of the ward’s average 
income (Experian). The instrumental variables station density and employment potential are 
regenerated data that stem from nomis (workplace employment) and the Ordinance Survey 
(rail stations). 
For the analysis of the capitalization effects of designation we use transactions data related to 
mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data 
for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for individual housing 
units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics include floor space 
(m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of 
construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type 
of heating. There is also some buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or 
leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer. Importantly, the transaction data includes 
the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordi-
nates.  
With this information it is possible within GIS to calculate distances to conservation area bor-
ders and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside of these borders. Further-
more, it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g., densities) for the 
                                                             
10  http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/ 
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amenities and environmental characteristics such as National Parks, as well as natural features 
like lakes, rivers and coastline. The postcode reference also allows a merger of transactions and 
various household characteristics (median income and ethnic composition) from the UK census, 
natural land cover and land use, various amenities such as access to employment opportunities, 
cultural and entertainment establishments and school quality. A more detailed description of all 
the data used is in the appendix. 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1  Designation process 
Table 1 reports the results of our tobit model of the designation process defined in equation 
(24). The non-instrumented baseline model is in column (1). As predicted by our theory, in-
creases in educational levels that are presumably correlated with heritage preferences are asso-
ciated with reductions in the share of undesignated land. More precisely, an increase in the de-
gree share by 1% is associated with a 0.12% reduction in the share of undesignated land. This 
decrease corresponds to an           ̅      ̅          increase in the share of desig-
nated land for a ward with the mean of the positive initial designation shares  ̅        . The 
effect substantially increases once we instrument the change in degree share using rail station 
density and employment potential (column 2). This increase is in line with unobserved (posi-
tive) deterioration trends that a) increase the likelihood of designation and b) are negatively 
correlated with changes in degree share. Introducing the instruments, the effect of a 1% in-
crease in degree share on the share of undesignated land increases to 0.52%, which for a ward 
with the mean initial designation share  ̅    corresponds to an increase in the designated land 
share of about 11%. While we have argued that our estimates are supposed to reflect a causal 
estimate of gentrification (proxied by degree shares) on designation probabilities and not nec-
essarily a causal effect of degree share on designation share, a parameter estimate of  ̂       is 
at least indicative of heritage preferences increasing relatively steeply in education. 
In a series of robustness checks columns (3) to (5) in Tab. 1 provide variations of the bench-
mark model (2). We add TTWA effects to control for unobserved institutional heterogeneity in 
column (3). Column (4) adds a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain from 
ward-level regressions of log property prices on a time trend (and property controls, see the 
appendix for details). In this specification we control for a potentially positive correlation be-
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tween owners’ risk aversion and the value of their properties – typically their largest assets. 
This is a potentially important control since a larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a 
policy that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighborhood and, thus, potentially 
increases the optimal designation share. It is a demanding control since positive price trends 
are potentially endogenous to changes in neighborhood composition and may thus absorb some 
of the gentrification effect on designation. The price trends are indeed positively, though not 
statistically significantly, associated with increases in the share of designate land. Adding con-
trols capturing vacancy trends and levels, the density of listed buildings and some risk and vul-
nerability assessments from the Conservation Areas Survey tend to increase the education ef-
fect (column 5).  
Across all specifications we find that, besides positive changes in designation share, high initial 
levels of degree shares are positively correlated with increases in the share of designated land. 
While high initial and positive changes in homeownership rate, ceteris paribus, are associated 
with less designation, it is notable that the (positive) impact of neighborhood change on desig-
nations shares (interaction term) is particularly large in high homeownership areas (see column 
6). This is in line with a political economy literature that suggests that homeowners tend to 
form well-organized interest groups (e.g. Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2013; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; 
Dehring, et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a). Aside from the uninstrumented model (1), the results in 
Table 1 suggest contagion effects in designation, i.e., designated land shares tend to increase 
where shares were initially high. 
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Tab. 1.  Designation process 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 Δ log share undesignated land (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) 
    
-0.116*** 
(0.019) 
-0.519*** 
(0.061) 
-0.587*** 
(0.105) 
-0.528*** 
(0.062) 
-0.560*** 
(0.061) 
-0.513*** 
(0.060) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.127*** 
(0.010) 
-0.276*** 
(0.024) 
-0.337*** 
(0.046) 
-0.280*** 
(0.024) 
-0.289*** 
(0.025) 
-0.269*** 
(0.023) 
log designation share (t-
1) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.035*** 
(0.013) 
-0.026* 
(0.033) 
-0.025** 
(0.013) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.189*** 
(0.025) 
0.263*** 
(0.029) 
0.319*** 
(0.042) 
0.262*** 
(0.029) 
0.259*** 
(0.033) 
0.255*** 
(0.028) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.127*** 
(0.015) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
0.091*** 
(0.018) 
0.053*** 
(0.018) 
0.042*** 
(0.018) 
0.153*** 
(0.040) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
0.042 
(0.037) 
0.031 
(0.040) 
0.006 
(0.046) 
0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.040) 
0.047 
(0.040) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
0.073* 
(0.046) 
-0.016 
(0.049) 
-0.122* 
(0.066) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
-0.075 
(0.051) 
-0.013 
(0.049) 
log price trend  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
Δ log vacancy rate (t)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
log vacancy rate (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
Log listed buildings den-
sity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1E-4 
(0.004) 
 
 
average condition score 
(1 best, 4 worst) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.070*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
average vulnerability 
score (1 low, 8 high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.045*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
average trajectory score 
(-2 improving, +2 deteri-
orating) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.043 
(0.036) 
 
 
Δ log degree share (t) x 
homeownership (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.201*** 
(0.085) 
Constant 0.013 
(0.046) 
0.052 
(0.048) 
0.231* 
(0.119) 
0.018 
(0.067) 
0.039 
(0.065) 
0.096** 
(0.051) 
TTWA Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO 
CHI2  350.753 634.960 368.036 475.892 354.198 
EXOG_P  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID  0.017 . 0.100 0.073 0.009 
OVERIDP  0.897 . 0.752 0.787 0.926 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density and employment poten-
tial in all models except model (1). Model (4) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no 
price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, 
**p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Further robustness 
While our IVs comfortably pass the typical statistical tests, we have experimented with four 
alternative sets of IVs. We have also split up the 1991–2011 long difference into two shorter 
differences (1991–2001 and 2001–2011), used the change in income as a proxy for heritage 
preferences (for 2001–2011) and run the baseline model in OLS keeping only observations with 
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positive changes in shares of designated land. The results are presented in the technical appen-
dix and support those discussed here. 
5.2  Pareto optimality 
Difference-in-differences 
Tab. 2.  shows the results from an estimation of the standard DD equation (26) for different se-
lections of control groups and fixed effects. Each model includes controls for property, location, 
and neighborhood characteristics, year effects and location fixed effects to hold unobserved 
time-invariant effects constant. Column (1) is a naive DD using the mean price trend of all prop-
erties located beyond 500m of a treated conservation area as a counterfactual. Columns (2) to 
(7) provide more credible counterfactuals by restricting the control group to properties that are 
presumably similar to the treated properties. Column (2), with ward fixed effects, and (3), with 
nearest CA fixed effects, provide a spatial matching by restricting the sample to properties with-
in 2km of a treated CA, where many unobserved location characteristics are likely to be similar. 
In column (4) we impose the additional restriction that properties in the control group must fall 
within 500m of the boundaries of a historically designated conservation area (before 1996), 
which increases the likelihood of unobserved property characteristics being similar. While areas 
that are designated at any point in time are likely to share many similarities, the diminishing 
returns to designation in our theoretical framework also imply that heritage-richer areas should 
generally be designated first. To evaluate whether the designation date of the treated conserva-
tion areas, relative to those on the control group, influences the DD estimate, we define CA des-
ignated 1996–2002 as a treatment group and form control groups based on CAs designated just 
before (1987–1994) or right after (2003–2010) in columns (5) and (6). In column (7), finally, 
we use environmental, property and neighborhood characteristics to estimate the propensity of 
being in a treated (1996–2010) CA over a historical (<1996) CA. Then the treated CAs are 
matched to their ‘nearest-neighbor’, i.e., the most similar non-treated CA, based on the estimat-
ed propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). A fixed effect is defined for each treated CA 
and its nearest-neighbor control CA such that the treatment effect is estimated by the direct 
comparison between the treated CA and its nearest-neighbor. 
We anticipate that the strength of the counterfactual increases as we match the treatment and 
control group based on proximity (2 & 3), proximity and qualifying for designation (4, 5, & 6) 
and qualifying for designation and a combination of various observable characteristics (7). As 
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the credibility of the counterfactual increases, the statistical significance of the treatment effect 
tends to decrease. Benchmarked against the nationwide property price trend both the internal 
effect (Inside × Post) and the external effect (Within 500m × Post) are significant at the 5% lev-
el. The magnitudes of these effects are of similar size, implying a 2.8% premium for houses in-
side newly designated conservation areas and a 2.3% premium outside. The spatial matching (2 
& 3) renders the internal treatment effect insignificant (2 & 3). With further refinements in the 
matching procedure the external effect also becomes insignificant. Tab. 2.  results, thus, suggest 
that designation does not lead to significant property price adjustments. Evidence is weak for 
positive (policy) spillovers to nearby areas. 
Tab. 2.  Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Nearest treat. CA effects NO NO YES YES YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Treatment group:  
CAs designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2010 
Control group Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA des-
ignated 
before 
1996 & 
within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA des-
ignated 
1987-
1995 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA  
Within 
500m of 
CA des-
ignated 
2003-
2010 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matche
d on 
propen-
sity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587,375 -156,426 -130,469 -67,046 -5,408 -8,475 -41,184 
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 178k 21k 32k 133k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in 
columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Temporal RDD-DD 
Tab. 3. illustrates the results of the estimation of the (temporal) RDD-DD outlined in equation 
(27). We present the results of a variety of models that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–
10) trends and several of the control groups utilized in Tab. 2. One important finding across 
these specifications is that the external (Within 500m × Post) ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter estimate is 
significant in four of 10 specifications at the 5% level and in one half of the specifications at the 
10% level, whereas, the internal (Inside × Post) parameter is only significant in one specifica-
tion at the 10% level (column 8). This suggests primarily that there exists a significant treat-
ment effect exactly at the treatment date only for the external area. This interpretation is in line 
with the predictions of our theoretical model. Another finding illustrated by Tab. 3. is the posi-
tive change in the internal price trend after a CA has been designated (Inside treated CA × Post 
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designation × Years designated). The change in trend, which is significant at the 5% level in sev-
en of the 10 models, may be regarded as evidence for a cumulative internal effect of the designa-
tion policy. There is also a faster appreciation in the external area post-designation that is signif-
icant in four of the 10 models. In short, the temporal RDD-DD has confirmed that designation 
policy causes no immediate effect inside the conservation area but shows instead that it in-
creases the speed of price appreciation over time. The RDD-DD has also uncovered that areas 
external to the conservation area receive an immediate shift in prices at the designation date in 
line with our theoretical hypothesis.  
Fig. 2 provides a graphical illustration of the predicted effect of being in the treatment group 
over the control group against years-since-designation. A horizontal red line is drawn at the 
mean of the pre-treatment effects in order to illustrate the differences between the RDD-DD 
results and those of the standard DD. The positive impact of designation on (relative) price 
trends suggested by the RDD-DD (black lines) is supported by the functionally more flexible 
semi-parametric estimates for the ‘years-since-designation bins’ (grey dots).11 However, the 
post-treatment effects are never statistically distinguished from the pre-period mean, which is 
in line with the DD estimates. 
Fig. 2. provides an analogical illustration for the external treatment effect, i.e., the spillovers 
onto areas adjacent to the designated CAs. Again, the post-period estimates do not deviate sig-
nificantly from the pre-period mean. However, the top-left panel illustrates a large discontinuity 
at the treatment date that is statistically significant in Tab. 3. As with the internal effects, there 
is a positive trend shift post-designation.  
                                                             
11  Confidence bands for the semi-parametric ‘bins’ model are presented in the appendix. 
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Tab. 3. Regression discontinuity design of differences between treatment and control (RDD-DD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post designation 0.015 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.038* 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
Within 500m buffer of treated CA  
× Post designation 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated²  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Inside treated CA × Post designation  
× Years designated 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Post Designation  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation ×Years des. 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation × Years des.² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Nearest treated CA effects NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Control group as in Tab. 2, column (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) 
R² 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 
AIC -547,688 -147,818 -120,160 -64,425 -39,321 -548,078 -147,839 -120,191 -64,467 -39,329 
Observations 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas 
inside and outside a conservation area. Observations dropped if years designated falls outside of range -10 years:+10 years. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Fig. 2. RDD-DD internal estimates 
Nearest treated CA (linear trends)  
Tab.3, column (4) 
 
Matched CA (linear trends) 
Tab. 3, column (5) 
 
Nearest treated CA (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 3, column (9) 
 
Matched CA (quadratic trends) 
Tab. 3, column (10) 
 
Note:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and es-
timated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). The grey 
dots plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate re-
gression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates 
the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
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Fig. 3. RDD-DD external estimates 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Tab. 3, column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Tab. 3, column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends) 
Tab. 3, column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 3, column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and es-
timated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented Aiken and West (1991). The grey 
dots plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate re-
gression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates 
the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Spatial RDD-DD 
Tab. 4 shows the results of the estimation of the (spatial) RDD-DD model outlined in equa-
tion (28). As with the temporal RDD-DD, we present the results of a variety of models that 
feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control groups utilized 
in Tab. 2. One interesting and consistent feature of Tab. 4 is that the positive discontinuity 
coefficient (Outside × Post) matches the expected (positive) sign under the existence of a 
policy cost inside. However, the parameter is statistically insignificant in all models.  
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We have argued that the model predictions for capitalization effects under a (locally) effi-
cient designation policy and a spatial decay in heritage externalities hold at the conserva-
tion area boundary, i.e., we expect a zero effect just inside and a positive effect just outside 
the boundary. Fig. 4 illustrates the joint effect of the parametric estimates reported in Tab. 
4 at varying (internal and external) distances from the CA boundary. With the control 
group of historical CAs within 2km of the treatment CA (left panels) we find a positive cap-
italization effect just inside and outside the boundary, which is in line with the baseline DD 
result in Tab. 2, column (4). Moreover, the treatment effect increases toward the center for 
the CA and decreases in external distance to the boundary until it becomes zero at around 
700m. This distance is in line with existing evidence on a relatively steep decay in heritage 
and housing externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Lazrak, et al., 2013; Rossi-Hansberg, 
et al., 2010). However, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero at almost all 
distances. The single exception is a significant (at 5% level) 1.6% effect just outside the CA 
in the quadratic model. While the effect is only significant within 100m of the CA, this is 
precisely where we expect a positive effect in a world with spatial decay in heritage (hous-
ing) externalities. In the context of the model the lower and not statistically significant 
effect just inside the CA indicates the presence of a cost that compensates for some of the 
benefits associated with designation.  
With the control group of matched CAs (right panels) the treatment effect just inside the 
CA boundary is remarkably close to zero. The joint effect just outside the boundary is posi-
tive, although not statistically significant. Briefly summarized, the spatial RDD-DD model 
suggests that across the treated CAs owners – at least on average – are not harmed by des-
ignation. There is some evidence that owners just outside a conservation area receive 
some benefit.  
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Tab. 4. Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Within 1400m of treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary x Post des. 
-0.057 
(0.081) 
-0.032 
(0.075) 
-0.030 
(0.080) 
-0.029 
(0.077) 
-0.070 
(0.068) 
-0.096 
(0.156) 
-0.046 
(0.154) 
-0.040 
(0.162) 
-0.040 
(0.157) 
-0.118 
(0.143) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.059 
(0.132) 
-0.017 
(0.131) 
-0.018 
(0.140) 
-0.017 
(0.136) 
-0.099 
(0.130) 
Outside treated CA × Post designa-
tion 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary × Post des. 
0.039 
(0.081) 
0.016 
(0.075) 
0.013 
(0.080) 
0.011 
(0.078) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.064 
(0.157) 
0.014 
(0.155) 
0.013 
(0.163) 
0.004 
(0.159) 
0.080 
(0.145) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.070 
(0.133) 
0.028 
(0.132) 
0.025 
(0.140) 
0.029 
(0.136) 
0.109 
(0.130) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Nearest treated CA effects NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Control group Full Eng-
land sam-
ple 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1400km 
of CA 
designat-
ed before 
1996 & 
within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1400m of 
pre-1996 
CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
Full Eng-
land sam-
ple 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1400m of 
CA desig-
nated 
before 
1996 & 
within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1400m of 
pre-1996 
CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.905 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.921 
AIC -587,538 -156,448 -130,478 -118,076 -101,076 -587,533 -156,444 -130,478 -118,074 -587,538 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Ahlfeldt/Möller/Waights/Wendland: Game of zones 32 
Fig. 4. RDD-DD spatial treatment effects 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Tab. 4. , column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Tab. 4. , column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 4. , column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 4. , column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and es-
timated using equation (28). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). 
6 Conclusion 
Historic preservation policies are among the most restrictive planning policies used to 
overcome coordination problems in the housing market internationally. These policies 
aim at increasing social welfare at the cost of constraining individual property rights. 
From the perspective of owners of properties in conservation areas, the policy may help to 
solve a collective action problem, preventing owners from freeriding on the heritage char-
acter of nearby buildings while inappropriately altering their own property. If property 
owners value the heritage character of nearby buildings and can influence the designation 
process they will seek out a (local) level of designation where the marginal costs of desig-
nation equate the marginal benefits. An increase in the marginal benefit of designation will 
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lead to an increase in designation activity. If the policy is Pareto-efficient, additional desig-
nations in a neighborhood will not lead to an adverse impact on those being designated.  
We provide evidence that is supportive of this scenario using two empirical approaches 
that follow from a simple model of (locally) efficient conservation area designation. First, 
we present a neighborhood level IV tobit analysis that reveals a positive impact of an in-
crease in degree share, which is presumably (positively) correlated with heritage prefer-
ences, on the share of designated land. Gentrification, by increasing the value of neighbor-
hood stability to local owners, can cause designation. Second, we combine the strengths of 
difference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to estimate the 
capitalization effect of designation on newly designated areas as well as spillovers to adja-
cent areas. This RDD-DD methodology qualifies more generally as a useful tool for pro-
gram evaluations where a treatment is suspected to lead to an impact on (spatial or tem-
poral) trends and discontinuities. Within newly designated conservation areas we find no 
significant short-run effects of designation and some evidence for positive capitalization 
effects in the long run. There is some evidence for positive spillovers onto properties just 
outside. 
These results are in line with a Pareto-efficient designation policy, at least from the per-
spective of the local owners. Either, the policy is deliberately Pareto-maximizing local 
owner welfare or, as suggested in the literature on the political economy of housing mar-
kets, homeowners are able to successfully influence the outcome of local policies in their 
interest. In any case, it is important to note that our results do not imply that the policy is 
necessarily welfare-enhancing on a wider geographic scale. Depending on the excessive-
ness of the policy and the general restrictiveness of the planning system, historic preserva-
tion may constrain housing supply and generate welfare losses. The net-welfare effect to a 
wider housing market area is an interesting and important question that we leave to fu-
ture research. 
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Technical appendix:  
Game of zones: The economics of conservation areas 
1 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone or as a replace-
ment. Section 2 provides an illustration of how a planner determines the Pareto-efficient desig-
nation share and adds to the theory section of the main paper. Section 3 complements the empir-
ical strategy section of the main paper by providing a more detailed discussion of the control 
variables in tobit designation process models. The section also links the reduced form differ-
ence-in-differences parameters to the marginal policy effect in the theoretical model. Section 4 
provides a detailed overview of the data we use, its sources, and how they are processed. Finally, 
section 5 complements the empirical results section of the main paper by showing the results of 
a variety of robustness tests and model alterations not reported in the main paper for brevity. 
2 Theory and context 
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
This section briefly illustrates how a planner determines the Pareto-efficient designation share. 
The equilibrium between the social marginal benefits (MB) of designation (equation 9 in the 
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main paper) and the marginal costs (MC) (equation 10) is depicted by Figure A1. At point A the 
designation share D is Pareto-efficient. Social marginal benefits equal the private marginal costs 
associated with designation. A further extension would benefit all owners to the left of A as they 
would profit from increasing the expected heritage in the neighborhood without experiencing a 
change in marginal cost. To the right of A, however, the social marginal benefit would also in-
crease, but the increase would not compensate for the private marginal costs associated with a 
change in the designation status from undesignated to designated. The expansion would not be 
Pareto-optimal. 
If there is, for instance, a change in preferences and residents develop a greater taste for external 
heritage   their marginal benefits curve shifts to the right. A Pareto-optimal planner adapts to 
this situation and raises the designation share to set marginal benefits equal to marginal costs 
again. This new Pareto-optimal equilibrium is illustrated by point B where the designation share 
increases to D’. 
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Fig A1. Designation equilibrium 
 
3 Empirical strategy 
3.1  Designation process – control variables 
This section provides a detailed description and motivation of the control variables we use to 
account for the determinants of conservation area designation that are unrelated to the mecha-
nisms modeled in our theory. In particular we try to control for composition effects, neighbor-
hood sorting, heterogeneity in terms of homeownership, and whether the heritage in a neigh-
borhood is at particular risk.  
We add the initial period (1991) degree share for two reasons. First, we assume that the highly 
educated derive higher (net-)benefits from neighborhood heritage. To the extent that this group 
is capable of more efficiently articulating their will in a political bargaining a higher degree share 
will make the designation more likely. It is important to control for the initial degree share since 
levels and changes may be correlated in either direction. On the one hand there may be catch-up 
growth in the degree share of less educated regions, i.e., mean reversion. On the other hand, 
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people with degrees may be more likely to move to areas with an already high share of people 
with degrees, which would imply a self-reinforcing process leading to spatial segregation.  
We also include a control for the extent of designation in the initial period (1991). The share of 
designated land area in the total ward area would be (positively) correlated with the change in 
the designation share if designations spark further designations as in a contagion model. Initial 
designation also helps to control for the possibility that the skilled may be attracted to areas 
with a lot of designated land. Another set of controls is driven by the interest in homeowners 
within the designation process. Homeowners experience extra benefits/costs from designation 
since, unlike renters, they are not compensated for changes in neighborhood quality by increas-
es in degrees or rents. Homeowners, thus have additional incentives to engage in political bar-
gaining. Similar to the other controls, homeownership status enters in lagged levels and differ-
ences. In a final specification we also add an interaction of the logged change in degree with 
homeownership (rescaled to a zero mean to make coefficients comparable). We use average 
household size (both in differences and lagged levels) to control for the presumption that larger 
households are more likely to lobby against designation and the resulting constraint on available 
floor space.  
We add a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain from ward-level regressions 
of log property prices on a time trend (and property controls).  
A larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty regarding the 
future of the neighborhood and, thus, potentially increases the optimal designation share. To 
control for a potentially positive correlation between owners’ risk aversion and the value of 
their properties – typically their largest assets – we add a measure of neighborhood apprecia-
tion. We generate ward-level property price trends in n separate auxiliary regressions of the 
following type: 
where X is a vector of property and neighborhood characteristics and T is a linear time trend. To 
avoid a reverse effect of designation on the property price trend we only consider transactions 
that occur outside conservation areas.  
   (    )                     
 
(A1) 
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A second set of controls deals with potential development risk. Areas that experience develop-
ment pressure or are in poor and/or declining condition may be more likely to be designated in 
order to protect against the threats to the heritage character of the neighborhood. We use the 
vacancy rate, a density measure of listed buildings as well as score measures for a conservation 
area’s condition, vulnerability and trajectory provided by English Heritage to capture develop-
ment pressure. We expect that neighborhoods with few vacancies will be put under higher de-
velopment pressure. Vacancies enter the specification both in differences and lagged levels. The 
reason for the differenced term is that a change in development pressure is likely to lead to a 
change in designation status as a result. We argue that the lagged level may also capture changes 
(not just levels) in development pressure. This is because of external factors and conditions (i.e., 
population growth) that effect areas unevenly depending on their level in certain attributes (e.g., 
vacant housing). It seems likely that general population growth would put greater development 
pressure on neighborhoods with lower vacancy rates. The score measures reflect the develop-
ment risk inside a conservation area and come from a survey provided by English Heritage. The 
higher the condition score, the worse the heritage conditions. A higher vulnerability as well as a 
higher trajectory are also indicated by higher scores. Except for the score variables, all control 
variables enter our empirical specification in logs. 
While taking first-differences of the empirical specification will remove all time-invariant ward-
specific effects that might impact on the level of designation (including the heritage itself), it will 
not help if there are location-specific effects that impact on the changes in designation status. For 
example, if there is heterogeneity across Local Authorities (LAs) about how difficult or easy it is 
to designate arising from different bureaucratic practices then this would affect changes in des-
ignation for all wards within a particular LA. We therefore estimate a fixed effects specification 
for the 166 English Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). The TTWAs are designed to approximate 
city regions which can be described as somehow self-contained economic areas from a job mar-
ket perspective. By applying a TTWA fixed effect model we are therefore able to control for so-
cio-economic heterogeneity across TTWAs.  
3.2  Difference-in-differences 
This section motivates the difference-in-differences approach for the estimation of the marginal 
policy effect. Firstly, we illustrate how the policy and heritage effects are difficult to disentangle 
in a simple cross-sectional hedonic estimation. Secondly, we lay out how the difference-in-
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differences treatment effect is used to estimate the marginal policy effect laid out in terms of the 
structural parameters of our model.  
Cross-sectional hedonics 
Taking logs of the spatial equilibrium price equation (17) from the main paper gives:1 
The following heritage and policy effects determine the bid rent: 
Consider the cross-sectional reduced form equation: 
where     is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property   in time period  ,    is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation area,    is a 
vector of controls for property, neighborhood, and environmental characteristics,    is a set of   
location fixed effects and    are year effects. The coefficient   on the     dummy identifies the 
policy cost associated with the location of a property inside a conservation area  ̃( )   . The 
policy cost should have a negative effect on logged house prices. The coefficient also partly iden-
tifies the internal heritage effect. Specifically, it identifies the value of the difference between the 
mean internal heritage inside conservation areas and the mean internal heritage outside conser-
vation areas (i.e.   (   )(      
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). This should be positive because the policymaker 
would normally designate areas that have the most heritage. Finally, under the existence of some 
spatial decay in externalities, it will also identify the value of the difference inside and outside 
conservation areas in the external heritage effect (i.e.,  (   )( [ | ]     
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   [ | ]     
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). 
This is a function of internal heritage and will therefore also be positive. 
                                                             
1 Where   is a constant and equal to:   (   )  
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The coefficient   thus reflects a composite effect of policy costs, policy benefits, and correlated 
internal heritage effect. Furthermore, in reality the actual distribution of internal heritage is un-
known and there is likely a spatial decay to externalities, further complicating the estimate.2 In 
practice,   will also be affected by unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are correlated 
with the distance to the conservation area. A positive   parameter, at best, tells us only that the 
overall higher levels of heritage (internal and external) combined with the policy benefits of 
conservation outweigh the policy costs. This does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the 
policy effect itself. To try and disentangle these effects we implement a different empirical ap-
proach. 
Difference-in-differences 
Using the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the marginal effect of a change in 
designation status offers an improved identification.  
Our empirical difference-in-differences specification is equation (26) from the main paper:  
Tab. A1. illustrates the conditional mean prices (after controlling for time effects) for the treat-
ment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment periods. It is important to note that the 
year fixed effects    capture the general development of price over time. Without this feature it 
would be necessary to control for the overall growth in price between the pre- and post-
treatment periods via the inclusion of a non-interacted version of       . 
                                                             
2 In a general case the estimate would be equal to: 
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Tab. A1.  
Conditional mean of prices Pre Post 
Treated (Internal)  ̅   
          ̅    
                
Control  ̅   
       ̅    
      
                 ( ̅    
       ̅   
     )  ( ̅   
     ̅   
   ) 
                 ([         ]  [  ])  ([ ]  [ ]) 
                       
Notes: The conditional mean of prices in the treatment group in the pre-period is denoted  ̅   
     . This represents 
the log of prices conditional on fixed and year effects (     ) and controls   . The same notation is used 
for the other groups. 
Our treatment coefficient        essentially differentiates across the treatment and control 
groups before and after designation and is, thus defined as follows: 
Let’s assume that the relationship between the observed conditional mean and the theoretical 
bid rent is given by:  
where     
      are partially unobservable factors specific to properties in the Treated-Post cell. 
The same relationship applies for the other cells (Treated-Pre, Control-Post and Control-Pre). At 
the heart of our identification strategy we assume that the price trends unrelated to the policy 
are the same within the treatment and the control group. The typical identifying assumption on 
which the difference-in-differences identification strategy relies can be expressed as follows: 
The credibility of the counterfactual rests on the likelihood that the treatment group, in the ab-
sence of the intervention, would have followed a trend that is similar to that of the control group. 
An appropriate definition of the control group is therefore a critical element of the identification 
strategy. We therefore consider a number of different control groups in which we try to reduce 
the potential heterogeneity between properties in the treatment and control group.  
The first treatment group is a spatial match where we choose the observations that fall within a 
2km buffer surrounding conservation areas that changed designation status during the observa-
tion period (1995–2010). As an alternative, we consider a number of matching procedures that 
       ( ̅    
       ̅   
     )  ( ̅    
     ̅   
   ) (A8) 
 ̅    
           
           
      
(A9) 
(     
          
     )   (     
        
   ) (A10) 
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rest on the idea that properties inside conservation areas generally share similarities. Properties 
in conservation areas that did not change designation status therefore potentially qualify as a 
control group. To make the areas in the treatment and control group more similar, we select 
conservation areas based on similarities with those in our treatment group (Rosenbaum & 
Ruben, 1983). For the matching procedure we only make use of variables that turn out to have 
significant impact in the auxiliary propensity score matching regression.3 We use a nearest 
neighbor matching procedure, which produces a broader and a narrower group. 
Under the assumptions made it is straightforward to demonstrate that the DD treatment coeffi-
cient gives the pure policy effect we are interested in. Combining the theoretical bid rent of 
equation (17) from the main paper with the definition of  ̅    
      in equation (A9) gives the condi-
tional mean price of (treated) properties inside newly designated conservation areas before 
(pre) and after (post) designation can be expressed as follows4: 
where a new designation is represented as an increase in designation share  . For a control 
group sufficiently far away to not be exposed to the heritage externality we similarly get: 
where there is (by definition) no new designation. Given the common trend assumption of equa-
tion (A10),        identifies the pure net policy effect of designation: 
                                                             
3 A list of significant controls in propensity score matching regressions is included in the next subsection. 
4 Where the theoretical locations   have been replaced by observed housing transactions  . 
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In the empirical implementation of the DD strategy we also consider alternative treatment 
groups that consist of properties just outside conservation areas, which are potentially exposed 
to spillovers, but not to the cost of designation. The interpretation of the external treatment co-
efficient can be derived analogically where designation leads to benefits but without the associ-
ated costs: 
Under the common trends assumption the treatment coefficient reflects the pure policy benefit 
associated with the reduction in uncertainty as predicted by the stylized theory: 
Propensity score matching regression 
In order to determine the control group for the difference-in-differences specification a propen-
sity score matching approach was employed. We used a stepwise elimination approach in order 
to determine which variables have a significant impact on propensity score. With a significance 
level criterion of 10% the following variables remained in the final CA propensity score estima-
tion: 
CA characteristics: Urban, Commercial, Residential, Industrial, World Heritage Site, At Risk and 
Article 4 Status. 
Environmental characteristics: Land Cover Type 9 (Inland bare ground), Land Cover Type 3 
(Mountains, moors and heathland), distance to nearest National Nature Reserve, distance to 
nearest National Park, National Park (kernel density) and Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
(kernel density).  
Neighbourhood characteristics: Median Income and Ethnicity Herfindahl index 
Amenities: Distance to nearest Bar, distance to nearest Underground Station, distance to near-
est Hospital, distance to nearest Motorway and distance to nearest TTWA centroid. 
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Semi-parametric temporal and spatial estimations of treatment effects 
We estimate a semi-parametric version of (27) that replaces the      variables with a full set of 
years-since-designation bins. We group transactions into bins depending on the number of years 
that have passed since the conservation area they fall into or are near to had been designated. 
Negative values indicate years prior to designation. These bins (b) are captured by a set of 
dummy variables   : 
The parameters   
  and   
  give the difference in prices between treatment and control groups in 
each years-since-designation bin  . The results of this semi-parametric estimation are plotted in 
Fig A2. in Appendix 5.2. In order to allow for a casual inspection of the fit of the parametric mod-
els the semi-parametric point-estimates are also plotted in Fig. 2 (internal) and Fig. 3 (external) 
of the main paper. 
As with the temporal models, we relax the parametric constraints of the spatial estimations by 
replacing the distance variable in equation (28) with distance bins: 
where    
  are positive (external) and negative (internal) distance bins from the designation 
area boundary and   
     are   treatment effect parameters at different distances inside and 
outside the conservation area. If the planner designates in a Pareto-optimal manner then the bin 
that corresponds to the locations just inside the treated conservation area should indicate a zero 
treatment effect. This may or may not be associated with a positive effect for the bins deepest 
inside the conservation area. Furthermore, if there are significant externalities associated with 
the designation (and heritage in general) then the bins just outside the boundary should indicate 
a positive effect. A lower effect for further out bins would indicate a spatial decay to this exter-
nality. The results from this specification are presented Fig A3. in Appendix 5.2 and in Fig. 4 of 
the main paper. 
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4 Data 
4.1 Data sources 
Housing transactions 
The transactions data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the Nationwide Building 
Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations 
and include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed property characteris-
tics. These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-
detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer infor-
mation including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time 
buyer. 
Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to 
be assigned to grid-reference coordinates. With this information it is possible within a Geo-
graphical Information Systems (GIS) environment to calculate distances to conservation area 
borders and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. Further-
more it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g., densities) for the 
amenities and environmental characteristics that will be used as control variables. Since the data 
set refers to postcodes rather than individual properties, it is not possible, however, to analyze 
repeated sales of the same property. This is a limitation shared with most property transaction 
data sets available in England, including the land registry data. 
Neighborhood characteristics 
The main variables used for estimating capitalization effects of neighborhood characteristics are 
median income and ethnic composition. The income data is a model-based estimate of median 
household income produced by Experian for Super Output Areas of the lower level (LSOA). This 
is assigned to the transaction data based on postcode. The data on ethnicity was made available 
by the 2001 UK Census at the level of Output Area (OA). Shares of each of the 16 ethnic groups 
and a Herfindahl index5 were computed to capture the ethnic composition of neighborhoods. 
                                                             
5 The Herfindahl index (  ) is calculated according to the following relation:    ∑   
  
   , where    is the 
share of ethnicity   in the LSOA, and N is the total number of ethnicities. 
Appendix to: Ahlfeldt/Moeller/Waights/Wendland: Game of zones 13 
Environmental variables 
The environmental variables capture the amenity value of environmental designations, features 
of the natural environment, different types of land cover and different types of land use.  
Geographical data (in the form of ESRI shapefiles) for UK National Parks, Areas of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty, and National Nature Reserves are available from Natural England. National 
Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty are protected areas of countryside designated 
because of their significant landscape value. National Nature Reserves are “established to pro-
tect sensitive features and to provide ‘outdoor laboratories’ for research” (National England 
website). Straight line distances to these designations were computed for the housing units as 
geographically located by their postcodes. Furthermore, density measures that take into account 
both the distance to and the size of the features were created. We apply a kernel density meas-
ure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2km which is considered to be the maximum distance 
people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005). 
The location of lakes, rivers and coastline are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. The dis-
tance to these features is also computed for the housing units from the transaction data. The UK 
Land Cover Map produced by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology describes land coverage by 
26 categories as identified by satellite images. We follow Mourato et al. (2010) who construct 
nine broad land cover types from the 26 categories. Shares of each of these nine categories in 
1km grid squares are calculated and the housing units take on the value of the grid square in 
which they reside. 
The generalized Land Use Database (GLUD) available from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government gives area shares of nine different types of land use within Super Output Are-
as, lower level (LSOA). These nine land use types are domestic buildings, non-domestic build-
ings, roads, paths, rail, domestic gardens, green space, water, and other land use. These shares 
are assigned to the housing units based on the LSOA in which they are located. 
Amenities 
The locational amenities variables capture the benefits a location offers in terms of accessibility, 
employment opportunities, schools quality, and the proximity of cultural and entertainment 
establishments. 
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Employment accessibility is captured both by the distance to Travel to Work Area (TTWA) cen-
troid and a measure of employment potentiality. TTWAs are defined such that 75 per cent of 
employees who work in the area also live within that area. Thus they represent independent 
employment zones and the distance to the center of these zones is a proxy for accessibility to 
employment locations. A more complex measure of accessibility is the employment potentiality 
index (Ahlfeldt, 2011).6 This is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and rep-
resents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs weighted by their distance. 
Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11) assessment scores are available from the Department for Education at 
the Super Output Area, middle layer (MSOA). School quality is thus captured at the housing unit 
level by computing a distance-weighted average of the KS2 scores of nearby MSOA centroids.7 
Geographical data on the locations of motorways, roads, airports, rail stations and rail tracks are 
available from the GB Ordinance Survey. Distances were computed from housing units to mo-
torways, A-roads, B-roads and rail stations to capture accessibility. Buffer zones were created 
around the motorways and roads along with distance calculations to rail tracks and airports in 
order to capture the disamenity noise effects of transport infrastructure. 
Further data on local amenities were taken from the Ordinance Survey (police stations, places of 
worship, hospitals, leisure/sports centers) and OpenStreetMap (cafés, restaurants/fast food 
outlets, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, theaters/cinemas, kindergartens and monuments, 
memorials, monuments, castles, attractions, artwork). The number of listed buildings was pro-
vided by English Heritage. Kernel densities for these amenities were computed for housing units 
using a kernel radius of 2km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986). The radius of 
2km is consistent with amenities having a significant effect on property prices only when they 
are within walking distance. 
                                                             
6 Further detail on the construction of the employment potentiality measure is provided in section 4.2. 
7 This is calculated as an Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) with a threshold distance of 5km and a  
power of 2. 
Tab. A2. Variable description 
Dependent Variable  
 
Price Per square meter transaction price in € of the corresponding  plot of land 
(expressed as natural logarithm). Transaction data from the Nationwide 
Building Society (NBS). 
Independent Variables  
 
CA Effects Dummy variables denoting property transactions taking place within the 
boundaries of an currently existing conservation area, in a conservation area 
at the time when designated or where the designation date is unknown as 
well as various buffer areas surrounding current or treated conservation 
areas. 
 
Fixed Effect Control Travel to Work Areas, nearest conservation area catchment areas and inter-
actives with year effects. 
 
Housing information Set of property variables from the NBS including: Number of bedrooms, 
number of bathrooms, floor size (in square meter), new property (dummy), 
building age (years), tenure (leasehold/freehold), central heating (full: gas, 
electric, oil, solid fuel), central heating (partial: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel), 
garage (single or double), parking space, property type (detached, semi-
detached, terraced, bungalow, flat-maisonette). 
 
Neighborhood infor-
mation 
Set of neighborhood variables including: media income (2005, LSOA level), 
share of white population at total population (2001 census, output area lev-
el), share of mixed population at total population (2001 census, output area 
level), share of black population at total population (2001 census, output 
area level), share of Asian population at total population (2001 census, out-
put area level), share of Chinese population at total population (2001 census, 
output area level), Herfindahl of ethnic segregation (including population 
shares of White British, White Irish, White others, Mixed Caribbean, Mixed 
Asian, Mixed Black, Mixed other, Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian others, 
Black Caribbean, Black African, Black other, Chinese, Chinese other popula-
tion, 2001 census output area). 
 
Conservation area 
Characteristics 
Set of characteristic variables for conservation areas from English Heritage 
including: Conservation area land use (dummy variables for residential, 
commercial, industrial or mixed land use), conservation area type (dummy 
variable for urban, suburban or rural type), conservation area size (dummy 
for areas larger than mean of 128,432.04 square meters), conservation area 
(square meter), conservation area has an Article 4 Direction implemented 
(dummy), oldness of conservation area (dummy for areas older than mean of 
1981), conservation area at risk (dummy), conservation area with communi-
ty support (dummy), conservation area is World Heritage Site (dummy). 
 
Environment Character-
istics and Amenities 
Set of locational variables processed in GIS including: National Parks (dis-
tance to, density), Areas of Outstanding Beauty (distance to, density), Natu-
ral Nature Reserves (distance to, density), distance to nearest lake, distance 
to nearest river, distance to nearest coastline, land in 1km square: Marine 
and coastal margins; freshwater, wetland and flood plains; mountains, moors 
and heathland; semi-natural grassland; enclosed farmland; coniferous wood-
land; broad-leaved/mixed woodland; urban; inland bare ground. 
 
Other amenities Set of locational variables created in GIS including: Average key stage 2 test 
score (MSOA averages as well as interpolated in GIS), distance to electricity 
transmission lines, A-Roads (distance to, buffer dummy variables within 
170m), B-Roads (distance to, buffer dummy variable within 85m), motorway 
(distance to, buffer dummy variable within 315m; buffer distances refer to 
the distance were noise of maximum speed drops drown to 50 decibel), dis-
tance to all railway stations, distance to London Underground stations, dis-
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4.2  Further notes on data methods 
Employment potentiality 
The employment potentiality index is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) 
and represents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs weighted by their distances. 
Employment potentiality is calculated for each Lower Layer Super Output Area   (LSOA) based 
on employment in all other LSOAs   using the following equation: 
where   measures the straight line distance converted into travel time assuming an overall av-
erage speed of 25km/h (Department for Transport, 2009) and Employment the absolute num-
ber of workers in the respective LSOA. The indicator is weighted by a decay parameter of    -
0.073 estimated by Ahlfeldt (in press). Internal distances are calculated as: 
Kernel densities for National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and National Nature 
Reserves 
The kernel density is a measure that takes into account both the proximity and the size of NPs, 
AONBs and NNRs. Every 100x100m piece of designated area is assigned a point and the density 
of these resulting points calculated for 10km kernels and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 
1986, p. 76, equation 4.5) around each housing unit using a kernel density method. The result is 
similar to calculating a share of NP area within a circle, the one difference being that the points 
are additionally weighted by distance to the housing units according to a normal distribution.  
tance to railway tracks, distance to bus stations, distance to airports, densi-
ties of cafés, restaurants/fast food places, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, 
theaters/cinemas, kindergartens, monuments (memorial, monument, cas-
tles, attraction, artwork), hospitals, sports/leisure centers, police stations 
and worship locations, distance to Travel to Work Areas, employment poten-
tiality (based on Travel to Work Areas with an time decay parameter of 
0.073). 
 
Neighborhood Distance 
Controls 
Set of neighborhood distance dummy variables created in GIS including: 
Distances outside conservation area border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m, 
250m, 300m, 350m, 400m, 1km, 2km and 3km), distances inside conserva-
tion area border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m). 
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Buffers for motorways and roads 
The buffer sizes for the different roads are as follows: B-Road (85m), A-Road (170m) and Mo-
torway (315m). These distances are calculated based on how far it is expected that the noise 
from traffic travelling at the speed limit of the respective roads (Steven, 2005) would decline to 
an assumed disamenity threshold level of noise of 50db (Nelson, 2008). 
Land cover map Broad Categories 
Tab. A3. Land Cover Broad categories as defined by Mourato et al. (2010)  
1 Marine and coastal margins 
2 Freshwater, wetlands, and flood plains 
3 Mountains, moors, and heathland 
4 Semi-natural grasslands 
5 Enclosed farmland 
6 Coniferous woodland 
7 Broad-leaved/mixed woodland 
8 Urban 
9 Inland bare ground 
 
5 Estimation results 
5.1  Designation process 
In order to test our theoretical implication that changes in heritage preferences lead to changes 
in designation we estimate the regression modeled as outlined in section 3.1. The prediction of 
the model is that positive changes in heritage preferences should lead to negative changes in the 
share of undesignated land in a neighborhood. OLS regression results are reported in Table A4. 
We drop all zeros and identify the effect based on the sample of observations with observable 
changes in conservation area shares. The standard OLS estimates without (1) and with a basic 
set of composition controls (2) are insignificant. Due to the potential sources of bias in OLS dis-
cussed in the main paper (section 3.1) we re-estimate the two models using our instrumental 
variables. The 2SLS estimates (3) and (4) are in line with the tobit results reported in the main 
paper and support the theory that a positive change in degree share leads to higher designation. 
Tab. A4. Designation regressions: OLS/2SLS models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.674*** 
(0.113) 
-0.279*** 
(0.085) 
log degree share (t-1)  
 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
 
 
-0.106*** 
(0.033) 
log designation share (t-1)  
 
0.169*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.147*** 
(0.023) 
Δ log homeownership (t)  
 
0.120*** 
(0.029) 
 
 
0.148*** 
(0.035) 
log homeownership (t-1)  
 
0.025 
(0.022) 
 
 
-0.030 
(0.026) 
Δ log average household size 
(t) 
 
 
-0.015 
(0.064) 
 
 
-0.067 
(0.052) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
 
 
0.005 
(0.030) 
 
 
-0.041 
(0.064) 
Constant -0.044*** 
(0.012) 
-0.033 
(0.031) 
0.430*** 
(0.081) 
-0.017 
(0.062) 
IV NO NO YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
R² 0.000 0.075 -1.023 0.015 
F 0.604 139.420 35.637 19.008 
AIC -931.737 -1045.816 210.758 -944.019 
OVERID . . 0.966 2.372 
OVERIDP . . 0.326 0.124 
Observations 1621 1621 1621 1621 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density and employment poten-
tial. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Table A5 reports the first stage results to the second-stage results reported in Table 1 in the 
main paper. Both IVs are (conditionally) positively correlated with the change in degree share, 
as expected. 
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Tab. A5. Standard IV models – First stage regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree 
share(t) x 
home-
ownership 
(t-1) 
rail station densi-
ty 
0.124*** 
(0.014) 
0.112*** 
(0.014) 
0.124*** 
(0.013) 
0.103*** 
(0.013) 
0.128*** 
(0.013) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
employment po-
tentiality 
3.2E-08*** 
(2.3E-08) 
2.5E-08*** 
(2.7E-09) 
3.2E-08*** 
(2.3E-09) 
3.8E-08*** 
(2.3E-09) 
3.2E-08*** 
(2.2e-09) 
9.5E-10*** 
(4.2E-10) 
predicted Δ log 
degree share (t) x 
homeownership 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.403*** 
(0.048) 
1.118*** 
(0.009) 
log degree share 
(t-1) 
-0.409*** 
(0.013) 
-0.454*** 
(0.009) 
-0.409*** 
(0.004) 
-0.429*** 
(0.004) 
-0.400*** 
(0.004) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
log designation 
share (t-1) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Δ log homeown-
ership (t) 
0.293*** 
(0.060) 
0.339*** 
(0.065) 
0.294*** 
(0.016) 
0.376*** 
(0.017) 
0.275*** 
(0.016) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
log homeowner-
ship (t-1) 
0.016 
(0.021) 
0.054 
(0.031) 
0.016* 
(0.011) 
0.073*** 
(0.011) 
0.210*** 
(0.025) 
-0.060*** 
(0.005) 
Δ log average hh. 
size (t) 
-0.075 
(0.084) 
-0.140* 
(0.055) 
-0.075*** 
(0.024) 
-0.032* 
(0.024) 
-0.052*** 
(0.024) 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
log average hh. 
size (t-1) 
-0.170 
(0.087) 
-0.315*** 
(0.090) 
-0.169*** 
(0.028) 
-0.070*** 
(0.005) 
0.171*** 
(0.028) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
Log price trend   0.004 
(0.012) 
   
Δ log vacancy rate 
(t) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
 
log vacancy rate 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.070*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
 
 
Log listed build-
ings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
average condition 
score (1 best, 4 
worst) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.011 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
average vulnera-
bility score (1 
low, 8 high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
average trajecto-
ry score (-2 im-
proving, +2 dete-
riorating) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.027) 
 
 
 
 
Constant 0.017 
(0.098) 
0.136 
(0.107) 
0.025 
(0.039) 
0.316*** 
(0.034) 
0.106*** 
(0.030) 
-0.032*** 
(0.005) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Price Trend NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Housing Cond. NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 
F 420.662 . 1756.16 1320.37 2093.28 18708.76 
R² 0.688 0.732 0.688 0.699 0.703 0.955 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density and employment poten-
tial in all models. Model (4) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could 
be computed due to insufficient transactions. We derive the instrument (predicted Δ log degree share (t) x 
homeownership (t-1)) for the interaction term in model (5) by interacting homeownership (t-1) with the 
predicted values of an auxiliary regression where we regress Δ log degree share on the exogenous varia-
bles, i.e. on the standard IVs and controls. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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We have tried four alternative IV models which are based on the benchmark model, i.e., includ-
ing the set of controls (Table 1, column 2 in the main paper). The coefficient estimates reported 
in Table A6 remain qualitatively similar and quantitatively close to the main model. First stage 
results are reported in Table A7 in the appendix. The alternative instruments, again, pass the 
validity tests. Only the overidentification test is failed by specification (1) using employment 
potentiality and museum density as instruments. 
Tab. A6. Alternative IV models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.488*** 
(0.063) 
-0.512*** 
(0.065) 
-0.502*** 
(0.063) 
-0.557*** 
(0.070) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.265*** 
(0.025) 
-0.274*** 
(0.025) 
-0.270*** 
(0.025) 
-0.291*** 
(0.027) 
log designation share (t-1) -0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.259*** 
(0.029) 
0.263*** 
(0.029) 
0.262*** 
(0.029) 
0.251*** 
(0.028) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.065*** 
(0.018) 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
0.046** 
(0.019) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
0.033 
(0.040) 
0.033 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.040) 
0.013 
(0.039) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
-0.009 
(0.049) 
-0.014 
(0.050) 
-0.012 
(0.049) 
-0.010 
(0.050) 
Constant 0.049 
(0.048) 
0.052 
(0.048) 
0.051 
(0.048) 
0.040 
(0.048) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
IV YES YES YES YES 
Observations  7965 7965 7965 7968 
CHI2 340.356 341.226 342.655 331.908 
EXOG_P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID 3.544 0.078 0.752 0.201 
OVERIDP 0.060 0.780 0.386 0.654 
Instruments (as densities 
except employment pot.) 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Rail station  
Museum  Coffee place  Bar  Coffee place  
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on 
fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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Tab. A7. Alternative IV models – first stage regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
employment potentiality 4.4E-08*** 
(1.9E-09) 
4.3E-08*** 
(1.9E-09) 
4.1E-08*** 
(1.9E-09) 
 
 
museum density 0.142*** 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coffee place density  
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
bar density  
 
 
 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
 
 
rail station density  
 
 
 
 
 
0.282*** 
(0.022) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.406*** 
(0.012) 
-0.406*** 
(0.012) 
-0.408*** 
(0.012) 
-0.399*** 
(0.010) 
log designation share (t-1) -0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.031* 
(0.012) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.285*** 
(0.065) 
0.274*** 
(0.063) 
0.285*** 
(0.068) 
0.260*** 
(0.061) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.025) 
-0.038 
(0.031) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
-0.101 
(0.078) 
-0.098 
(0.077) 
-0.088 
(0.079) 
-0.040 
(0.108) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
-0.192* 
(0.083) 
-0.204* 
(0.084) 
-0.188* 
(0.082) 
-0.127 
(0.086) 
Constant 0.039 
(0.092) 
0.051 
(0.094) 
0.035 
(0.091) 
-0.015 
(0.091) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7968 
F 396.188 517.118 441.850 552.553 
R² 0.686 0.685 0.686 0.681 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on 
fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Furthermore, we have split the long difference between 1991 and 2011 into two shorter differ-
ences of 1991 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011. For the latter short difference we moreover used the 
change in income instead of change in degree as a proxy for heritage preferences. The coefficient 
estimates remain qualitatively similar to the main model and are reported with their first stages 
in tables A8 and A9. The coefficient of the key variable is slightly smaller in the benchmark speci-
fication of the short different between 1991 and 2001 (column 4) and considerably larger for 
the period between 2001 and 2011 (column 8). In columns (9)–(12) we use income as a proxy of 
heritage preference. Focusing on the benchmark specification in the final column, doubling in-
come more than quadruples the designation share. The respective instruments are valid and 
sufficiently strong. Overall, the results are in line with our theory; increases in heritage prefer-
ences, proxied by change in degree or change in income, lead to increases in designation shares. 
Tab. A8. Short differences and income model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
Δ log des-
ignation 
share (t) 
             
Δ log degree share 
(t) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.229*** 
(0.022) 
-0.064*** 
(0.011) 
-0.193*** 
(0.031) 
0.464*** 
(0.051) 
1.618*** 
(0.124) 
-0.066 
(0.077) 
-2.790*** 
(0.910) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log degree share (t-
1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.063*** 
(0.005) 
-0.092*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
 
-0.140*** 
(0.022) 
-0.689*** 
(0.186) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log designation 
share (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-0.050*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
 
 
0.022 
(0.018) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
Δ log homeowner-
ship (t) 
 
 
 
 
0.109*** 
(0.024) 
0.152*** 
(0.026) 
 
 
 
 
0.225*** 
(0.084) 
0.895*** 
(0.236) 
 
 
 
 
0.278*** 
(0.082) 
0.134 
(0.113) 
log homeowner-
ship (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.061*** 
(0.010) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
0.185*** 
(0.025) 
0.390*** 
(0.074) 
 
 
 
 
0.225*** 
(0.026) 
0.244*** 
(0.036) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
 
 
 
 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.031 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
 
-0.220* 
(0.132) 
-0.813*** 
(0.257) 
 
 
 
 
-0.227* 
(0.130) 
0.774*** 
(0.276) 
log average house-
hold size (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.090*** 
(0.031) 
0.046 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
0.108 
(0.068) 
-0.140 
(0.107) 
 
 
 
 
0.198*** 
(0.070) 
0.671*** 
(0.145) 
Δ log income  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.204*** 
(0.068) 
-9.152*** 
(1.981) 
-0.210*** 
(0.067) 
-4.357*** 
(0.959) 
log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.201*** 
(0.026) 
-0.498*** 
(0.078) 
Constant 0.153*** 
(0.005) 
0.231*** 
(0.010) 
-0.024 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.031) 
0.311*** 
(0.021) 
-0.125*** 
(0.042) 
0.246*** 
(0.066) 
0.615*** 
(0.140) 
0.535*** 
(0.026) 
2.825*** 
(0.513) 
1.702*** 
(0.179) 
4.203*** 
(0.630) 
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
IV NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 7968 7965 7968 7965 7969 7966 7969 7966 7969 7966 7969 7966 
CHI2  106.812  215.197  171.695  169.534  21.347  122.739 
EXOG_P  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
OVERID  2.165  1.188  1.485  15.948  13.591  0.061 
OVERIDP  0.141  0.276  0.223  0.000  0.000  0.805 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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Tab. A9. Short differences and income model – First stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log in-
come (t) 
Δ log in-
come (t) 
rail station density 0.117*** 
(0.032) 
0.102*** 
(0.012) 
-0.061*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.018 
(0.029) 
employment poten-
tiality 
5.14E-8*** 
(0.000) 
4.99E-8*** 
(0.000) 
-2.35E-8*** 
(0.000) 
-1.87E-9 
(0.000) 
5.69E-9* 
(0.000) 
5.44E-9 
(0.000) 
log degree share (t-
1) 
 
 
-0.262*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
-0.209*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
log designation 
share (t-1) 
 
 
-0.040* 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
Δ log homeowner-
ship (t) 
 
 
0.411*** 
(0.083) 
 
 
0.253*** 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.064) 
log homeowner-
ship (t-1) 
 
 
-0.038 
(0.022) 
 
 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.040* 
(0.017) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
 
 
-0.145* 
(0.064) 
 
 
-0.217*** 
(0.065) 
 
 
0.220*** 
(0.037) 
log average house-
hold size (t-1) 
 
 
-0.236** 
(0.077) 
 
 
-0.069* 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.130** 
(0.044) 
Log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.095*** 
(0.020) 
Constant 0.327*** 
(0.008) 
-0.036 
(0.083) 
0.390*** 
(0.005) 
0.112*** 
(0.030) 
0.255*** 
(0.004) 
0.741*** 
(0.113) 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966 
F 34.876 443.629 74.997 544.976 8.308 12.770 
R² 0.103 0.504 0.095 0.602 0.004 0.068 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clus-
tered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
5.2  Pareto optimality 
Tab. A10. below reports the conservation area effects as well as the full set of hedonic con-
trols for the difference-in-differences estimation given by equation (26) in the main paper. 
Column (7) shows that housing units with more bathrooms and bedrooms fetch higher pric-
es, as do detached, semi-detached, and bungalows (over the omitted category 
flats/maisonettes). The sales price of terraced housing is insignificantly different from 
flats/maisonettes. Larger floor spaces are associated with higher price but with significant 
diminishing effects. There is a premium for new properties. Leased properties are of less val-
ue than those owned. Properties with parking spaces, single garages and double garages sell 
for higher prices than those without any parking facilities. There is a house price premium for 
properties with central heating over other types of heating. In order to control for a potential-
ly non-linear relationship between housing age and house prices we included a series of 
house age bins. In order to separate the effects of pure building age (which may be associated 
with deterioration) from the build date (which may strongly determine the architectural 
style) we allow for age cohort and building data cohort effects. Since the ‘New property’ vari-
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able identifies all properties where the build age is zero years, the omitted category from the 
age variables is 1–9 years. All of the bins for properties older than this indicate significant 
negative premiums. The negative premium increases with age, mostly quickly over the first 
few categories and then more slowly until the penultimate category and finally decreases for 
buildings over 100 years. The effect of the build date is also non-linear. The general tendency 
is for buildings built in earlier periods to have higher prices than buildings built in the omit-
ted period 2000–2010. However, this effect becomes insignificant in the 60s and 70s; periods 
associated with the architectural styles of the post-ward reconstruction phase that are today 
less appreciated than other styles. The greatest premium is attached to houses built pre-
1900, the earliest category. 
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Tab. A10.  Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Inside treated CA  
× Post designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Number of bathrooms 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Number of bedrooms 0.166*** 
(0.002) 
0.172*** 
(0.004) 
0.169*** 
(0.005) 
0.165*** 
(0.005) 
0.170*** 
(0.014) 
0.179*** 
(0.011) 
0.158*** 
(0.006) 
Number of bedrooms 
squared 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Detached house 0.254*** 
(0.003) 
0.222*** 
(0.005) 
0.211*** 
(0.008) 
0.194*** 
(0.007) 
0.235*** 
(0.015) 
0.216*** 
(0.014) 
0.193*** 
(0.007) 
Semi-detached house 0.119*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.007) 
0.070*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.073*** 
(0.006) 
Terraced 
house/Country cottage 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
Bungalow 0.311*** 
(0.003) 
0.285*** 
(0.006) 
0.281*** 
(0.008) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
0.292*** 
(0.019) 
0.269*** 
(0.016) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
Floorsize (m²) 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Floorsize (m²)  
× Floorsize (m²) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
New property 0.084*** 
(0.002) 
0.087*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.005) 
0.088*** 
(0.006) 
0.047** 
(0.024) 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
Leasehold -0.054*** 
(0.003) 
-0.067*** 
(0.004) 
-0.065*** 
(0.006) 
-0.073*** 
(0.006) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
-0.104*** 
(0.012) 
-0.070*** 
(0.006) 
Single garage 0.112*** 
(0.001) 
0.097*** 
(0.002) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.003) 
0.096*** 
(0.007) 
0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
Double garage 0.190*** 
(0.002) 
0.162*** 
(0.003) 
0.161*** 
(0.005) 
0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.160*** 
(0.015) 
0.156*** 
(0.010) 
0.158*** 
(0.005) 
Parking space 0.076*** 
(0.001) 
0.063*** 
(0.002) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.061*** 
(0.003) 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.005) 
0.063*** 
(0.003) 
Central heating 0.089*** 
(0.001) 
0.094*** 
(0.002) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
0.094*** 
(0.007) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
Building age: 10–19 
years 
-0.047*** 
(0.002) 
-0.063*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
-0.075*** 
(0.005) 
-0.071*** 
(0.016) 
-0.068*** 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.005) 
Building age: 20–29 
years 
-0.079*** 
(0.002) 
-0.106*** 
(0.005) 
-0.104*** 
(0.007) 
-0.125*** 
(0.008) 
-0.133*** 
(0.026) 
-0.126*** 
(0.021) 
-0.113*** 
(0.007) 
Building age: 30–39 
years 
-0.092*** 
(0.003) 
-0.127*** 
(0.006) 
-0.123*** 
(0.010) 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
-0.169*** 
(0.032) 
-0.141*** 
(0.027) 
-0.133*** 
(0.009) 
Building age: 40–49 
years 
-0.104*** 
(0.004) 
-0.148*** 
(0.008) 
-0.142*** 
(0.012) 
-0.180*** 
(0.013) 
-0.199*** 
(0.036) 
-0.165*** 
(0.031) 
-0.158*** 
(0.011) 
Building age: 50–59 
years 
-0.121*** 
(0.004) 
-0.171*** 
(0.009) 
-0.167*** 
(0.015) 
-0.207*** 
(0.016) 
-0.232*** 
(0.044) 
-0.204*** 
(0.038) 
-0.175*** 
(0.014) 
Building age: 60–69 
years 
-0.135*** 
(0.005) 
-0.198*** 
(0.011) 
-0.194*** 
(0.019) 
-0.238*** 
(0.020) 
-0.320*** 
(0.051) 
-0.265*** 
(0.042) 
-0.215*** 
(0.018) 
Building age: 70–79 
years 
-0.136*** 
(0.006) 
-0.213*** 
(0.013) 
-0.207*** 
(0.021) 
-0.263*** 
(0.022) 
-0.326*** 
(0.053) 
-0.273*** 
(0.046) 
-0.234*** 
(0.019) 
Building age: 80–89 
years 
-0.132*** 
(0.007) 
-0.218*** 
(0.014) 
-0.213*** 
(0.023) 
-0.277*** 
(0.024) 
-0.339*** 
(0.062) 
-0.313*** 
(0.054) 
-0.243*** 
(0.021) 
Building age: 90–99 
years 
-0.111*** 
(0.008) 
-0.208*** 
(0.016) 
-0.204*** 
(0.025) 
-0.280*** 
(0.027) 
-0.360*** 
(0.068) 
-0.304*** 
(0.063) 
-0.248*** 
(0.023) 
Building age: Over 100 -0.083*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.261*** -0.348*** -0.284*** -0.227*** 
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years (0.009) (0.017) (0.027) (0.030) (0.074) (0.065) (0.025) 
Build date: 1900–1909 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.121*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.028) 
0.208*** 
(0.031) 
0.256*** 
(0.077) 
0.222*** 
(0.067) 
0.173*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1910–1919 0.074*** 
(0.008) 
0.153*** 
(0.016) 
0.158*** 
(0.027) 
0.226*** 
(0.028) 
0.262*** 
(0.071) 
0.256*** 
(0.059) 
0.196*** 
(0.024) 
Build date: 1920–1929 0.093*** 
(0.007) 
0.157*** 
(0.014) 
0.162*** 
(0.024) 
0.215*** 
(0.025) 
0.225*** 
(0.062) 
0.189*** 
(0.050) 
0.190*** 
(0.021) 
Build date: 1930–1939 0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.128*** 
(0.013) 
0.130*** 
(0.021) 
0.168*** 
(0.023) 
0.187*** 
(0.058) 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
0.151*** 
(0.020) 
Build date: 1940–1949 0.040*** 
(0.005) 
0.078*** 
(0.012) 
0.078*** 
(0.018) 
0.111*** 
(0.021) 
0.063 
(0.058) 
0.053 
(0.048) 
0.096*** 
(0.018) 
Build date: 1950–1959 0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.047) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
Build date: 1960–1969 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.044) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Build date: 1970–1979 -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
Build date: 1980–1989 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
-0.023 
(0.038) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Build date: 1990–1999 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
Build date: pre 1900 0.098*** 
(0.009) 
0.149*** 
(0.018) 
0.162*** 
(0.029) 
0.244*** 
(0.031) 
0.312*** 
(0.081) 
0.259*** 
(0.070) 
0.216*** 
(0.026) 
Location cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES      
Nearest treated CA 
effects 
  YES YES YES YES  
Matched CA effects       YES 
Treatment group: CAs 
designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2010 
Control group Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-1996 
CA & 
within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA desig-
nated 
1987-
1995 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA desig-
nated 
2003-
2010 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on 
propen-
sity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587375 -156426 -130469 -67044 -5410 -8475 -41206 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 178k 214k 323k 133k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control 
groups in Columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation 
area. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Semi-parametric temporal and spatial treatment effects 
Fig A2. reports the results for the semi-parametric estimation of the temporal effects of des-
ignation using equation (A19). Instead of simply presenting our two strongest specifications, 
as we do in the main paper, here we present a different dimension to the results bin by com-
paring the bin estimates for the naïve DD in the left panels to the matched CA control group in 
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the right panels. The left charts show that the post-period internal and external estimates 
deviate significantly from the pre-period mean (hence the significant DD estimates) but that 
this is driven by a general upward trends. This corroborates the results in Tab. 2., column (1) 
of the main paper where no significant discontinuity nor shift in trend for the naïve control 
group exists and hence the advantages of the RDD-DD over the standard DD method is high-
lighted. The charts in the right panels also corroborate the evidence presented using the par-
ametric trends equations in the main paper. Specifically, they show that for the internal ef-
fects the post-treatment estimates tend not to deviate significantly from the pre-treatment 
effects but that there are upward shifts in the trend when compared to the pre-treatment 
trend. For the external effects there is a general upward trend in the less carefully matched 
control groups and a downward trend in the stronger control groups but no shift in the trend 
at the designation date. 
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Fig A2.  Semi-parametric temporal bins estimates 
Internal effects: Full dataset 
Tab. A10. column (1) 
 
Internal effects: Matched CA 
Tab. A10. column (7) 
 
External effects: Full dataset 
Tab. A10. column (1) 
 
External effects: Matched CA 
Tab. A10. column (7) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots the estimated differences between treatment group and control group 
against year since designation date using equation (A19). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence 
intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used in column (1) of appendix Tab. A10. . 
The right charts show results for the control group used in column (7) of appendix Tab. A10. . The hor-
izontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Fig A3. demonstrates the semi-parametric spatial effects using different bin sizes of 100m 
and 200m using appendix equation (A20). These semi-parametric charts closely resemble 
their parametric counterparts. Notably, there is no significant and positive effect in the first 
bin outside the conservation area when using the preferred specification of column (7) from 
Tab. A10. This is consistent with the parametric findings and baseline DD findings that there 
is no significant external policy effect and that our second hypothesis cannot be accepted. 
There is, however, one significant bin inside the conservation area at 200–300m. This pro-
vides some support for the idea that heritage externalities are stronger deeper within the 
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conservation areas such that there may be a positive policy effect. This effect then declines to 
zero for the deepest bin of greater than 300m.  
Fig A3.  Semi-parametric spatial bins estimates 
200m bins: Full dataset 
Control group as in Tab. 4., column (1) 
 
200m bins: Matched CA 
Control group as in Tab. 4., column (5) 
 
100m bins: Full dataset 
Control group as in Tab. 4., column (1) 
 
100m bins: Matched CA 
Control group as in Tab. 4., column (5) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots estimate the difference-in-differences treatment effect at different distances 
from the conservation area boundary using appendix equation (A20). The dashed lines indicate the 5% 
confidence intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used Tab. 4., column (1). The 
right charts show results for the control group used in Tab. 4., column (5). The horizontal red lines il-
lustrate the mean of the pre-treatment estimates, the final pre-period bin and the first post-period bin. 
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